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Abstract 
This paper seeks to explore nexus between the volatility in the 
Kenyan interbank market and Treasury bill market in the event of market 
distress arising from collapses of a lender. Three stress triggering events are 
defined; -the placement of Dubai Bank, Imperial Bank and Chase Bank 
placement under receivership. The inclusion of Treasury bill market is aimed 
to ascertaining whether then Central Bank’s intervention in the market to 
correct inefficiency in the interbank market upon the collapse of a lender is 
either proactive or reactive. The EGARCH and TGARCH were used to 
model the relationship.  Key finding of the study is that 91-Day Treasury bill 
rate positively and significantly affects the interbank market rate with the 
effect doubling in the wake of bank collapse.  
 
Keywords: Interbank, Volatility Clustering, GARCH models and leverage 
effect 
  
Introduction  
 The role of the interbank market in any economy is critical in 
allocation of liquidity from banks with surplus to the banks facing liquidity 
deficit.  Shocks in the interbank market caused by liquidity stress are 
impediments for an efficient interbank market. These shocks lead to 
volatility in the interbank market as could be seen in the interbank traded 
volumes and interbank rates. In the worst scenario, these shocks bring 
distortions that could lead to increased costs of participating in the interbank 
market. When the shocks to the interbank market are system-wide, the 
central bank assumes an intermediary function between liquidity surplus 
banks and liquidity deficit banks. We posit that by doing so, the central 
bank takes a reactive intervention as opposed to a proactive role in 
restoring effectiveness in the interbank market. Such interventions could 
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arise in the wake of a bank run, collapse of a bank, placement of a bank 
under statutory management among others. Unlike other components of the 
financial markets that are typically analysed in the context of their interface 
with the wider economy, the interbank market is often seen in the narrow 
context as an exclusive banking industry market. In that regard, the critical 
role of the inter-bank market in ensuring stability is understated. It is 
therefore for these reasons that central banks focus on the interbank markets 
in implementing monetary policy.  
 However, despite the crucial role of interbank markets in any 
financial system, relatively littles attention has been accorded to them. 
According to Allen and Gale (2009), the existing empirical work on 
interbank markets seems to focus more on inefficiencies arising from 
incompleteness of interbank markets. For instance, Frexias et al  
(2009) looks at interbank market integration under asymmetric information 
asserting that by setting interest rates that depend on pattern of idiosyncratic 
risk shocks the government can implement constrained efficient allocation of 
credit in the market. Studies by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Gorton and 
Huang (2004, 2006), Diamond and Rajan (2005, 2008), and Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2008) assert that in financial markets where markets for 
liquidation do not work properly or are absent some form of government 
intervention may improve efficiency. This informs our choice for Treasury 
bill which is both a market tool and a policy tool. Such studies in the Kenyan 
Market are missing.  
 For this reason, this paper seeks to put a spotlight on Kenya’s 
interbank market, particularly how it operates during periods characterised 
by stress. More specifically, the paper looks at how the interbank market 
volatility is affected by financial stress arising from a bank failure. Secondly, 
the paper explores the transmission between the interbank market rate and 
the Treasury bill rate in the event of bank failure. This second objective 
therefore focuses as to whether the Central Bank intervention in the credit 
market in the event bank failure is reactive or proactive in managing the 
interbank market volatility. Therefore the two main questions addressed by 
this paper are: How does the volatility in Kenya’s interbank market call rate 
change with the events of three commercial bank failure namely Dubai bank, 
Imperial bank and Chase bank? Secondly, is there transmission between 
interbank market rate and the Treasury bill rate in the event of the three 
commercial bank failures? Answering these two pertinent questions fills in 
the gap on the scanty information on the area. Currently a number of studies 
have been conducted on Kenya’s interbank market. However no study seems 
to have been carried out on the effects of the current bank failures on the 
volatility of the interbank market call rates. This is perhaps on the backdrop 
that the collapse of Dubai, Imperial and Chase bank is a recent phenomenon. 
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Secondly, there lacks a local empirical study on the how the Central bank 
intervention through the open market operation tools such as Treasury bills 
in the wake of bank failure affects interbank market volatility. Lastly is the 
scarcity of empirical studies on the transmission between the interbank 
market call rates and the Treasury bill rates in the presence of the recent 
three bank failures. By filling in these gaps the study contributes to policy in 
a number of ways. One of such contributions is on the issues as to whether, 
the Central bank intervention in the credit market via open market operation 
in the wake of bank failure help to resolve the structural inefficiencies of the 
interbank market. This is informed by the transmission between the 
interbank call rates and the Treasury bill rates.  To the existing literature, this 
paper add to the body of knowledge by going beyond modelling of the 
interbank market rate volatility to linking such volatilities on specific events 
on bank failures. This shed lights into how interbank market volatility 
changes in the collapse of small bank (Dubai bank) as opposed to a collapse 
of medium sized bank (Chase bank and Imperial bank). By the same 
symmetry, the paper adds to existing literature on the transmission between 
interbank market rates and Treasury bill rate by extending such transmissions 
to specific bank failure dates. This way it informs on what is the nature of 
transmission between the two rates in the event of collapse of a tier three 
bank (Dubai bank) as compared to a collapse of tier two bank (Imperial and 
Chase bank).  
 Our modelling of the transmission between interbank rate and 
Treasury bill rate is hinged on the work of Allen and Gale (2009) in their 
analysis of interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention. 
According to them, inadequate opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic 
risk and the aggregate liquidity shocks, there tend to exist excessive price of 
volatility in the interbank market. In such phenomenon, central bank can 
intervene in the credit market via implementation of constrained efficient 
allocation using open market operations to fix the short term interest rates. 
One of such tools would be treasury bills.  
 
Why the interbank market in Kenya  
 Analyses of Kenya’s interbank market have tended to focus on its 
linkages to monetary policy conduct (Oduor, et. al., 2014; Alper, 2016, et. 
al.). The linkages are explored on the back of the inter-bank being 
considered to be not only inefficiency but also segmented. While the 
inefficiency characteristic of the interbank market in the context of Kenya 
would be attributable to the relativity of market depth compared to those 
markets considered to be close to efficient, segmentation is a function of 
market structure and is therefore not unique.  
 Stylised characterisation of interbank markets that underpin 
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theoretical and empirical studies (Kim, 2014) draw on the “small-bank”–
“big-bank” dichotomy. Three outcomes point toward the odds typically 
being against small banks: First is that big banks lend to each other at a rate 
close to the central bank target rate. Second is that a small bank borrowing 
from a big bank tends to pay a higher rate than central bank target rate while 
if the small bank was lending to a big bank, it will get a lower rate than the 
central bank target rate. Thirdly is that a small bank trading with a big bank 
will only get more favourable terms for larger loans. 
 These three characteristics are nuanced in the Kenyan case, cognisant 
that the policy signalling ability of the interbank rate is constrained by 
inefficiency and segmentation attributes. We therefore contextualise the 
Kenyan market along three characteristics: One, banks in the “big” category 
– to the extent that size is perceived to be a basis for quality – lend to each 
other at less limiting terms that they do to “small” banks. This view is 
aligned to Kim (2014).Two, the interbank network structure is asymmetrical 
such that “big” banks often have opportunity for access relationships across 
the industry while “small” banks do not.  The ease of access is enhanced if a 
bank belongs to a regional or international network, a perspective 
highlighted by Deb (2016) in a comparison between belonging to different 
networks and creating a related party network.  In other words the benefits of 
multimarket banking as envisaged in Berrospide, et. al., (2016) go beyond 
spreading credit and funding risks to include boosting interbank market 
access at the local level.  Lastly, in the event of flight to quality – and if the 
perspective is that size and quality have a positive correlation – banks in the 
“small” category are subject to the access, not even cost, squeeze.           
 By seeking to understand the interbank market beyond its 
relationship with monetary policy conduct, this paper enhances the 
appreciation of the market when it is distressed. Such appreciation is often 
masked when the market is superficially assessed based on the volume-price 
tracking. As Figure 1 shows, the recent evolution of the Kenyan interbank 
market shows ‘normal’ market behaviour. In reality, the market has been far 
from normal. In the recent episodes three banks, considered “small” under 
the “small bank - big bank” dichotomy, were placed under receivership by 
the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) anchor this paper’s analytical stress 
triggers. As Kim (2014) observes, the disadvantage that small banks 
experience in the interbank market during a crisis can largely be explained 
by a shift in the liquidity cost, rather than by changes in loan supply and 
demand. In the Kenyan case, such distress could be seen to be beyond costs; 
in stances there has been obvious supply cuts that cannot be observed from 
the aggregated datasets.  
 In order to unmask the interbank market, we step back and looks at 
the basics of why the interbank market exists in the first place. We then trace 
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the linkages between the inter-bank market and other markets with a view to 
assessing whether the signal of distress could be picked from another price 
besides the interbank rate.  The conceptual thinking of looking for the 
distress signal of one money market price in another money market price is 
motivated by Dornbusch (1976) seminal analysis and especially its core 
observation that financial markets are dynamic to the extent of the that prices 
of relatively more liquid financial assets adjusting much faster than goods’ 
prices or even other financial assets such as loans.   
 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya 
 
 The interbank market could aptly be described as a liquidity co-
insurance market (Castiglionesi, et. al., 2014). Banks are typically exposed 
to liquidity risks by virtue of the fact that they transform short-term liquid 
liabilities to long-term illiquid assets. To manage the risk, they hold reserves 
as a self-insurance mechanism. Reserves however present a cost to banks as 
they forgo income by not investing in risky assets that are illiquid or at the 
very least near-liquid assets such as short-tenor government securities. Banks 
therefore participate in the interbank market where they exchange resources 
with each other thus co-insuring themselves against liquidity risks. The 
existence of the interbank market by no means imply that the ensuing co-
insurance offers a full solution to liquidity challenges. The interbank solution 
to liquidity challenges becomes at best partial, considering that liquidity 
challenges could be systemic, in which case it is impossible to co-insure. 
Furthermore, the interbank market being typically an over-the-counter affair 
means that it hinges on pre-established connections that could be limited; 
this makes it hard to co-insure liquidity risks if there are no pre-established 
connections or they have been severed. As an alternative, banks could resort 
to capital holders to whom they will adjust the pay-out; in essence banks 
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could transfer part of the liquidity uncertainty to capital holders, this itself 
being costly because capital to banks also comes at a cost. The foregoing 
rationale for the existence of the interbank market as well as the alternatives 
in the form of reserves and capital with the attendant costs, are instructive on 
how to approach the understanding of the recent distress in interbank market 
in Kenya following three episodes namely placing of receivership of Dubai 
Bank Limited on 13th August 2015, Imperial Bank Limited on 15th October 
2015 and Chase Bank Limited on 7th March 2016.  These episodes point 
towards three linked observations that are key to this paper’s objective. This 
informs the first objective of the paper which is the effect of financial stress 
arising from bank failure on the credit market volatility.  
 First, pre-existing connections at a bilateral level were severely tested 
to the disadvantage of “small banks”, which are manly borrowers in the 
interbank market. It didn’t help that the “small banks” experienced capital 
flight as could be confirmed by the CBK on April 2016 when it availed a 
liquidity support framework for commercial and microfinance banks 
following market linked to the placement of Chase Bank Limited under 
receivership. Under the circumstances, the lender banks in the interbank 
market considered the Treasury Bills market as an alternative. Second, the 
challenges associated with the three banks – whose common characteristics 
are that they were all local banks without foreign principals and were not in 
the “big-bank” category – were not considered to be systemic in the sense of 
affecting the general stability of the Kenyan banking industry. In any case 
pinning systemic risks to a given institution is not easy (Danielsson et. al., 
2016). Nonetheless, the effect on the interbank market has been system-
wide. Third, there is no evidence to suggest that the liquidity challenges 
observed and the ensuing system-wide effect on the interbank market have 
led to a capital response from shareholders; in any case such response 
requires more time.  
 These observations motivate the search for a signal alternative to the 
interbank rate to guide gauge the persistence or lack thereof of distress 
following market disturbance. Given the first observation, this paper 
hypothesises that the alternative signal can be picked from the shortest tenor 
of the Treasury Bills market. The hypothesis stems from two factors. One, 
there is a very close association between the interbank rates and the 91-Day 
Treasury Bill rates (Figure 2).  
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Source: Central Bank of Kenya 
 
 Two, the Treasury Bills have both policy and market inclinations. To 
the extent it is associated with Government resource requirements as 
triggered by the fiscal policy stance, the Treasury Bills market could have a 
big influence on the overall market liquidity as the government is arguably a 
major market player. A rise in the Treasury Bill rate could be interpreted as 
signal of tight liquidity conditions owing to the Government presence the 
market. The policy angle arises from the fact that CBK Monetary policy 
actions could somewhat be influence by the Governments fiscal action, a 
phenomenon called fiscal dominance. It is recognised that the CBK can 
influence liquidity in the market by way of repurchase orders (Repos). When 
banks have liquidity shortage, they can borrow from the CBK at the Repo 
rate – the rate at which the central bank lends short-term money to the banks 
against securities. A reduction in the Repo rate helps banks get money at a 
cheaper rate. The reverse repo rate - the rate at which the banks maintain 
surplus funds with CBK signals the level of liquidity surplus in the market. 
The reverse Repo rates have almost perpetually been zero. This is by no 
means suggestive of no instances of liquidity abundance in the market; 
instead it is suggestive of the limitations of using the Repo and reverse Repo 
rates as a signal of liquidity distress or abundance. This informs the second 
objective of the paper which is the transmission between interbank market 
and Treasury bill market in the event of a bank failure.  
 The next section of this paper specifies the model for the empirical 
assessment of the extent to which the Treasury Bills market reveals the 
nature of distress in the interbank market. The assessment is undertaken 
around three recent episodes of bank failures that distressed the interbank 
market at varying degrees. The empirical results are reported in the following 
section, upon which conclusions and policy inferences are made in the final 
section.  
European Scientific Journal June 2017 edition Vol.13, No.16 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
134 
Methodology 
 The paper models the nexus between interbank market volatility and 
Treasury Bill Market performance in the event of collapse of the lender by 
applying the ARCH family models given that the study deals with high 
frequency data which is on weekly basis. More specifically, the Exponential 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (EGARCH) by 
Nelson (1991) and Threshold Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedastic (TGARCH) model by Zakoian (1994) which is ideal for 
capturing information asymmetry in financial data. In this case they will be 
the ideal models for capturing information asymmetry in the credit markets 
both in the interbank and Treasury bill market in the event of a bank failure.  
 The setting of the study is that it’s an event based study. Three events 
of distress are defines in the study. First, is the collapse of Dubai bank on 
14th August 2015, secondly is the collapse of Imperial banks on 13th 
October 2015 and thirdly the collapse of Chase bank on 7th April 2016. 
Given that financial markets are driven by news we define the event to be 
one month prior to the actual announcement date of placing the bank under 
receivership. Given that the effect of the closure of the three banks was not 
concluded as at September 2016, it’s presumed that the events continue to 
influence the credit market. As such the end dates for the events are 
undefined. Based on the three events of bank collapse, we define five period. 
First is the period prior to the collapse of Dubai bank (period 1), period after 
collapse of Dubai bank (period 2), period between the collapse of Dubai 
bank and collapse of Imperial banks (period 3), period between collapse of 
imperial bank and collapse of Chase bank (period 4) finally the overall 
period that account for the entire study period. To test the effect of financial 
stress on the interbank market volatility, an event based analysis is employed 
in which three dummies are created namely: dummy Dubai, dummy Imperial 
and dummy Chase for the respective closure of the Dubai, Imperial and 
Chase bank. However, in order to test for the transmission between the 
interbank market and the Treasury bill market, a bivariate GARCH was 
applied. In this case, the interbank call rate was used to reflect the supply and 
demand patterns of bank reserves thus sending a signal to the Central banks 
to intervening in the credit market upon understanding of the market 
pressure. One of this interventions is through the open market operations 
where Treasury bill are frequently used having the shortest tenure.  
 Upon definition of the five period, the EGARCH and TGARCH 
models are estimated. First, the regressions of the three events of distress are 
done separately. Further regression of the overall combination the three 
events of distress which combine the collapse of the three banks. 
 The Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedastic (EGARCH) by Nelson (1991) and Threshold Generalized 
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Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (TGARCH) model by Zakoian 
(1994) are defined as follows: 
 The EGARCH and TGARCH models for interbank rates as follows: 
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Where:  
 tIR Is the current week interbank rate 
 1tIR − Is the previous week interbank rate 
 TBR is the 91-DayTreasury Bill Rates  
 tε is the error term for the model  
is the variance for the model 
 
 Model 1 is the mean equation while model 2 is the variance equation 
for the EGRACH model.  
Similarly, we specify our TGARCH model as follows: 
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 Model 3 is the mean equation while model 4 is the variance equation 
for the TGRACH model.  
 Bad news here refers to placement of a bank under statutory 
management while good news would refer to the revival of the lender who 
has been under statutory management.  Model 3 is the mean equation while 
model 4 is the variance equation for the TGARCH model. As stated earlier, 
this paper adopt a dual analysis approach unlike a one sided analysis 
approach. With this regard, therefore we acknowledge that what happens in 
the interbank market influences the open market operations in management 
of liquidity challenges in the market. By the same symmetry we specify our 
EGARCH and TGARCH models for Treasury bill market as follows:  
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Model 5 is the means equation while model 6 is the variance equation 
for the EGARCH model.  
2
tt   h σ=
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 Model 7 is the means equation while model 8 is the variance equation 
for the TGARCH model.  
 
Data  
 The study employs high frequency data in the analysis. Weekly data 
on the interbank market call rates and Treasury bill rate are applied in 
modelling the effect of the financial distress arising from the closure of 
Dubai, Imperial and Chase bank on the interbank market call rates as well as 
testing for the transmission between interbank market call rates and Treasury 
bill rates. The choice of the weekly data is informed by the fact that the 91 
Treasury bill data is available on weekly basis and not on the daily basis as 
the interbank market rate data. For the interbank rate the average weekly call 
rate is used. The study covers the period between December 2008 and 
August 2016.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 In analysis, period 1 represent the period from December 2008 to one 
month priory to announcement of receivership of Dubai bank. Period 2 is the 
period after Dubai bank collapse but prior to Imperial bank collapse. Period 
3 is after collapse of Imperial bank but before collapse of Chase bank. Period 
4 is after collapse of Chase bank. All the periods from period 2 are 
consecutive to each other.  From the descriptive statistics the mean interbank 
call rate increases with the collapse of Dubai bank but decline with collapse 
of Imperial and Chase bank accordingly. Similar trends are reported for 
standard deviation with the deviations from mean interbank call rate rising 
after Dubai bank closures and falling with the collapse of Imperial and Chase 
bank. On normality, it’s evident that the interbank call rates become more 
non-normally distributed with the successive bank failures after Dubai bank 
closure as captured by Kurtosis values.  
Table 1.0 Summary statistics for Interbank Call Rates 
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Mean 7.8319 8.1115 8.0018 7.8380 
Std. Dev. 5.8344 6.0580 5.9236 5.8383 
Skewness 1.5380 1.4364 1.4854 1.5438 
Kurtosis 5.7945 5.1849 5.4118 5.6373 
Observations 339 348 373 392 
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Table 2.0 Summary statistics for Treasury Bill Rates 
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Mean 8.5012 8.6700 8.8665 8.8222 
Std. Dev. 3.8696 4.0057 4.0015 3.9690 
Skewness 0.8175 .83532 0.8686 0.9176 
Kurtosis 4.5535 4.4071 4.5382 4.7750 
Observations 339 348 373 392 
 
Table 3.0 Covariance matrix interbank rates and Treasury bill rates 
 
Interbank Rate Treasury Bill Rate 
Interbank Rate 1.0000 0.7917 
Treasury Bill Rate 0.7917 1.0000 
 
 The covariance matrix between the squared interbank market rate and 
Treasury bill returns correlation of 0.7917 evidence a strong positive 
correlation with a implying that the two rates move together in same 
direction.  
 The financial sector stress periods is captured by the period in which 
three banks were placed under receivership. In this case we had period 1 
which is the period from January 2009 but before the placement of any bank 
under receivership, period 2 captures the period when Dubai bank was place 
under receivership, period 3 captures the time when Imperial bank was 
placed under receivership while period 4 captures the period when chase 
bank was placed under receivership. Period 5 captures all the three stress 
period in the banking industry, with the analysis period being January 2009 
to August 2016. 
Table 4.0 Unit root test 
  With Intercept With Intercept and Trend 
ADF test statistics Calculated Values 
Critical  
Values 
Calculated  
Values Critical Values 
Interbank Call Rate (R) -29.936 -3.432 (at 1%) -29.931 -3.961 (at 1%) 
   -2.862 (at 5%)  -3.411 (at 5%) 
   
-2.567 (at 
10%)  -3.127 (at 10%) 
AR  -29.932 -3.432 (at 1%) -29.928 -3.961 (at 1%) 
    -2.862 (at 5%)   -3.411(at 5%) 
 
 The test for stationarity is based on the Box and Jenkins (1976). 
Following this test the use of the dickey fuller test for unit root reveals that 
the weekly interbank call rates are integrated of order zero implying the 
absence of unit root. 
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Table 5.0: Exponential GARCH results for interbank market volatility analysis 
EGARCH (1, 1) Results 
Mean Equation 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Overall model 
Constant 0.0739** (0.0442) 
-0.0860*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0765** 
(0.0115) 
0.0637** 
(0.0463) 
0.1134*** 
(0.0013) 
Interbank (-1) 0.9196*** (0.0000) 
0.9312*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9186*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9225*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9362*** 
(0.0000) 
Treasury bill rate 0.0373 (0.0184) 
0.0677*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0635*** 
(0.0088) 
0.0606** 
(0.0159) 
0.0358 
(0.0095) 
Dummy Dubai  -1.0286** (0.0560)   
-1.1793 
(0.3917) 
Dummy Imperial   -0.1471** (0.0490)  
-1.2576 
(0.3671) 
Dummy Chase    0.0328 (0.8740) 
0.0874 
(0.7160) 
Variance Equation 
Constant 
-
0.4285*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3633*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4283*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4617*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4506*** 
(0.0000) 
ARCH  (1) (α1) 
0.6116*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4970*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6307*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6650*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6382*** 
(0.0000) 
Asymmetry (γ) 0.0381** (0.0297) 
0.1762*** 
(0.0015) 
0.1706 
(0.1943) 
0.1574 
(0.2718) 
0.1035 
(0.0895) 
GARCH (1) (β) 0.9405*** (0.0000) 
0.9568*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9679*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9739*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9665*** 
(0.0000) 
Dummy Dubai  0.3335* (0.0744)   
0.3100 
(0.1045) 
Dummy Imperial   -0.2629** 0.0126  
-0.5878*** 
(0.0087) 
Dummy Chase    0.2382*** (0.0053) 
0.5634*** 
(0.0001) 
 
R-squared 0.8422 0.8379 0.8380 0.8369 0.8350 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8413 0.8365 0.8367 0.8356 0.8329 
Sum Squared Residual 1815.6 2063.54 2114.6 2173.6 2199.04 
Log Likelihood -505.63 -538.59 -582.30 -619.41 -611.11 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 1.7320 1.7313 1.7442 1.7381 1.7524 
ARCH – LM TEST 
Constant 0.9642 *** (0.0000) 
0.9613*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9617*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9718*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9643*** 
(0.0000) 
Residual Squared 0.02960 (0.587) 
0.0301 
(0.5760) 
0.0295 
(0.5700) 
0.0246 
(0.6269) 
0.0294 
(0.5620) 
Observed  R2 0.2969 (0.5858 ) 
0.3148 
(0.5747) 
0.3248 
(0.5687) 
0.2377 
(0.6258) 
0.3383 
(0.5608) 
European Scientific Journal June 2017 edition Vol.13, No.16 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
139 
F - Statistics 0.2954 (0.5871) 
0.3133 
(0.5760) 
0.3233 
(0.5700) 
0.2367 
(0.6269) 
0.3369 
(0.5620) 
Observations 339 348 373 392 392 
Note: Significance probabilities in parenthesis, *** (significant at 1%) ** (significant at 5%) 
and * (significant at 10%). 
 
 From Table 5.0, it is clear that from the mean equation, the previous 
week’s interbank rate significantly affects the current week’s interbank rate. 
This is evidenced by the coefficient of Interbank (-1) for period 1 which is 
0.9196 significant at 1 percent significance level. Similar results are 
replicated for the other periods and the overall model at large. The mean 
equation results indicate that the 91 Treasury bill rate positively and 
significantly affects the interbank market rate in all the periods. However, 
the results indicate that the effect rises significantly up in the stress times as 
compared to the stress free period. Prior to placement of any lender under 
receivership, the effect of 91 Treasury bill rate on interbank rate stands at 
0.0373. This doubles to 0.0677 upon collapse of Dubai bank, 0.0635 upon 
collapse of Imperial bank and 0.0606 with placement of Chase bank under 
receivership. For the overall stresses combined, the effect of 91 Treasury bill 
rate on interbank rate volatility is 0.0358. Both the Dubai bank dummy and 
the imperial bank dummy negative affect the interbank rates with only the 
imperial bank dummy being significant.  
 From the conditional variance equation results, the arch 1 (α1) reveal 
that volatility clustering was high following the placement of Chase bank 
under receivership as compared to Dubai and imperial bank case. However, 
as for the persistence in the shock as measured by GARCH term (β), it’s 
clear that upon the occurrence of a financial stress, the persistence of 
volatility in the interbank market rises.  For the period 1, β = 0.9405. 
However, upon financial stress the value of β (s) for period 2 up to period 4 
are close to unity. Therefore, volatility shocks at the interbank are long lived 
rather than transitory. This implies that the Central bank intervention to 
restore the efficiency of the interbank market in allocating liquidity does not 
solve the structural challenges within the interbank hence long lived shocks 
in the interbank market upon the occurrence of such banking industry 
shocks.  
 The Exponential GARCH captures the asymmetry at the interbank 
market which is measured by coefficient γ. γ=0.0381 in absence of financial 
stress. However, in presence of financial stress, the measure of asymmetry 
rises significantly. Its significance reveal presence of asymmetry and thus 
bad and good news drive the interbank market. 
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Table 6.0: Exponential GARCH results for Treasury bill market volatility analysis 
EGARCH (1, 1) Results  - Treasury Bill Rates 
Mean Equation 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Overall model 
Constant 0.1324*** (0.0000) 
0.1271*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1260*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1135*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1400*** 
(0.0000) 
Treasury bill rate 
(-1) 
0.9436*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9452*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9423*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9472*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9419*** 
(0.0000) 
Interbank 0.0499*** (0.0000) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0515*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0480*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0507*** 
(0.0000) 
Dummy Dubai  0.9362*** (0.0080)  
-0.0337* 
(0.0913) 
1.2002*** 
(0.0028) 
Dummy Imperial   0.1360** (0.0403)  
-1.0096*** 
(0.0138) 
Dummy Chase     -0.2100*** (0.0105) 
Variance Equation 
Constant -1.2361*** (0.0000) 
-1.2227*** 
(0.0000) 
-
1.1050*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.0659*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.2545*** 
(0.0000) 
ARCH  (1) (α1) 
1.3097*** 
(0.0000) 
1.3375*** 
(0.0000) 
1.2683*** 
(0.0000) 
1.2449*** 
(0.0000) 
1.3332*** 
(0.0000) 
Asymmetry (γ) 0.8319*** (0.0000) 
-0.2586*** 
(0.0003) 
-
0.2346*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.2768*** 
(0.0001) 
0.8284*** 
(0.0000) 
GARCH (1) (β)  0.8503*** (0.0000) 
0.8719*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8725*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2452 
(0.7016) 
Dummy Dubai  0.3044 (0.5269)  
-0.3230* 
(0.0637) 
-0.1761 
(0.7920) 
Dummy Imperial   0.0163 (0.9041)  
-0.3642 
(0.1559) 
Dummy Chase      
 R-squared 0.9697 0.9696 0.9621 0.9619 0.9626 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.9696 0.9693 0.9618 0.9616 0.9621 
Sum Squared 
Residual 153.1402 169.3320 232.8156 234.4917 230.2463 
Log Likelihood -129.2375 -139.8237 -179.3197 -194.2565 -173.7698 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 1.1044 1.1612 1.0020 1.0109 1.0311 
ARCH – LM Test 
Constant 1.0180*** (0.0000) 
1.0199*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0228*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0197*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0117*** 
(0.0000) 
Residual Squared -0.0188 (0.7303) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.6987) 
-0.0252 
(0.6278) 
-0.0254 
(0.6163) 
-0.0193 
(0.7030) 
Observed  R2 0.1197 (0.7293) 
0.1509 
(0.6977) 
0.2366 
(0.6267) 
0.2515 
(0.6163) 
0.1456 
(0.7030) 
F - Statistics 0.1191 (0.7303) 
0.1501 
(0.6987) 
0.235497 
(0.6278) 
0.2527 
(0.6152) 
0.1463 
(0.7021) 
Observations 339 348 373 392 392 
Note: Significance probabilities in parenthesis, *** (significant at 1%) ** (significant at 5%) 
and * (significant at 10%). 
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 For the Treasury bill market, it is evidently clear that the previous 
week’s rate significantly positive influences the current week’s rate as given 
by Treasury bill (-1) coefficients in all the periods. However, looking at the 
effect of interbank market on the TB market, we find a unique outcome in 
that the interbank market positively and significantly affects the TB market. 
However, the change in of interbank market on TB market, is very minimal 
as we move from financial free situation to a situation of financial stress. 
This is opposite of the effect of TB market on interbank where we find that 
the effect of TB market on interbank rates doubles as we move from 
financial stress free situation to financial stress situation. On volatility, high 
volatility clustering is evidenced in all period as measured by (α1). The 
persistence of volatility as measured by GARCH (1) (β) changes minimal 
across all periods. This is opposite of the results of the EGARCH results for 
interbank market. 
 Further we apply the Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model analysis 
to ascertain the presence or absence of leverage effect in the allocation of 
liquidity through the interbank market.  From Table 6.0 results we deduce 
that placement of Imperial and chase bank under receivership negatively 
impacts on interbank rates though insignificant. The effect of Treasury bill 
rate on interbank market still remains to be high with the banking sector 
stress compared to banking sector stress – free period with the effect being 
high for Dubai bank dummy. 
Table 7.0: Threshold GARCH results for interbank market volatility analysis 
TGARCH (1, 1) Results 
Mean Equation 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Overall Period 
Constant 0.0465 
(0.4996) 
0.0451 
(0.5194) 
0.0332 
(0.6118) 
0.0371 
(0.5973) 
0.0601 
(0.4734) 
Interbank (-1) 0.9425*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9411*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9316*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9290*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9400*** 
(0.0000) 
Treasury bill rate 0.0219 
(0.1539) 
0.0230 
(0.1366) 
0.0323** 
(0.0459) 
0.0312** 
(0.0482) 
0.0209 
(0.2518) 
Dummy Dubai  0.7120 (0.7405)   
0.2326 
(0.6226) 
Dummy Imperial   -0.3280 (0.1086)  
0.5982 
(0.7290) 
Dummy Chase    0.0769 (0.8770) 
-0.8250 
(0.6338) 
Variance Equation 
Constant 0.0150*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0203*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0226*** 
(0.0000) 
ARCH  (1) (α1) 0.5821*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5636*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6584*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5584*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5910*** 
(0.0000) 
Asymmetry (γ) -0.4501*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4407*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.3348** 
(0.0155) 
-0.4365*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4332*** 
(0.0002) 
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GARCH (1) (β) 0.7102*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7160*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6340*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7104*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6791*** 
(0.0000) 
Dummy Dubai  6.2118 (0.3959)   
0.4588*** 
(0.0070) 
Dummy Imperial   -0.1893 (0.1341)  
3.5036 
(0.3396) 
Dummy Chase    0.3065** (0.0181) 
-3.6763 
(0.3171) 
 R-squared 0.8406 0.8369 0.8381 0.8370 0.8358 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8397 0.8355 0.8367 0.8358 0.8337 
Sum Squared 
Residual 1833.290 2076.564 2113.876 2172.071 2187.943 
Log Likelihood -510.3273 -538.7975 -587.053 -622.336 -619.513 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 1.7556 1.7362 1.7689 1.7506 1.7641 
ARCH – LM TEST 
Constant 0.9360*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9339*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0053*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9469*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9486*** 
(0.0000) 
Residual Squared 0.0549 
(0.3142) 
0.0569 
(0.2904) 
0.0024 
(0.9625) 
0.0450 
(0.3748) 
0.0420 
(0.4076) 
Observed  R2 1.0189 
(0.3128) 
1.1241 
(0.2890) 
0.0022 
(0.9624) 
0.7919 
(0.3735) 
0.6895 
(0.4063) 
F - Statistics 1.0159 
(0.3142) 
1.1213 
(0.2904) 
0.0022 
(0.9625) 
0.7895 
(0.3748) 
0.6872 
(0.4076) 
Observations 339 348 373 392 392 
Note: Significance probabilities in parenthesis, *** (significant at 1%) ** (significant at 5%) 
and * (significant at 10%). 
 
 Within the TGARCH model leverage effect is captured by α1 and α2 
which measure the bad news and good news on interbank market 
respectively. The sum of α1 and α2 measures the effect of bad news. For 
conditional variance equation, the coefficient β captures the degree of 
persistence of shocks while the sum of α +β give the persistence of shocks. 
The results posit that bad news in the event of banking industry stress 
impacts the interbank market more even with the Treasury bill rate market’s 
intervention compared to good news of the same magnitude signifying 
presence of leverage effect in the interbank market.  
Table 8.0: Threshold GARCH results for Treasury bill market volatility analysis 
TGARCH (1, 1) Results  - Treasury Bill Rates 
Mean Equation 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Overall model 
Constant 0.0848* (0.0770) 
0.1243*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0894*** 
(0.0007) 
0.1028*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3412*** 
(0.0004) 
Treasury bill rate (-1) 0.9570*** (0.0000) 
0.9459*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9347*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9539*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9289*** 
(0.0000) 
Interbank 0.0400*** (0.0000) 
0.0465*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0664*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0426*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0421*** 
(0.0000) 
Dummy Dubai  0.8933** (0.0166)   
1.0096*** 
(0.0000) 
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Dummy Imperial   0.1588*** (0.0324)  
-1.1063*** 
(0.0000) 
Dummy Chase    -0.0494*** (0.0031) 
0.0972 
(0.5342) 
Variance Equation 
Constant 0.1354*** (0.0000) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0010) 
0.2510*** 
(0.0000) 
ARCH  (1) (α1) 
0.5659*** 
(0.0000) 
1.9011 
(0.0000) 
1.2267*** 
(0.0000) 
1.3823*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4483*** 
(0.0000) 
Asymmetry (γ) 0.1327 (0.6164) 
1.0177*** 
(0.0214) 
0.7181*** 
(0.0052) 
1.5065*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2202 
(0.2499) 
GARCH (1) (β) -0.0035 (0.7148) 
0.0673*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2490*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2341*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0089 
(0.8200) 
Dummy Dubai  0.8441 (0.7025) 
0.0400 
(0.6107)  
0.0895 
(0.4936) 
Dummy Imperial     -0.0434 (0.8057) 
Dummy Chase    -0.0032 (0.6031) 
-0.2698** 
(0.0304) 
 R-squared 0.9697 0.9696 0.9614 0.9621 0.9643 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9695 0.9694 0.9611 0.9618 0.9639 
Sum Squared Residual 153.2099 169.1395 236.5859 233.5247 219.7956 
Log Likelihood -188.8387 -138.5437 -185.6090 -189.9136 -275.4887 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.1140 1.1619 0.9916 1.0123 1.0552 
ARCH – LM Test 
Constant 0.8320*** (0.0000) 
1.0367*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0334*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0422*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6643*** 
(0.0000) 
Residual Squared 0.0029 (0.9569) 
-0.0385 
(0.4748) 
-0.0366 
(0.4817) 
-0.0443 
(0.3822) 
0.0413 
(0.4092) 
Observed  R2 0.0029 (0.9567) 
0.5140 
(0.4734) 
0.4959 
(0.4817) 
0.7677 
(0.3809) 
0.6850 
(0.4079) 
F - Statistics 0.0029 (0.9569) 
0.5118 
(0.4748) 
0.4979 
(0.4804) 
0.7653 
(0.3822) 
0.6827 
(0.4092) 
Observations 339 348 373 392 392 
Note: Significance probabilities in parenthesis, *** (significant at 1%) ** (significant at 5%) 
and * (significant at 10%). 
 
 From table 8.0 results we deduce that placement of Imperial and 
chase bank under receivership negatively affected on Treasury bill market 
though significantly. However, as opposed to the previous results, the effect 
of interbank market on Treasury bill rate declines significantly with the 
banking sector stress compared to banking sector stress – free period. 
 
Conclusion 
 The paper aims at evaluating the effect of policy and market reaction 
towards promoting efficiency on the interbank market in the times of stress 
in the banking industry. The paper uses treasury bill–interbank market link 
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buttressed by the argument that in times of interbank market stress, the 
Treasury bill market is the resort of the lender banks seeking the next nearest 
liquid asset. As liquidity challenges in the “small” bank segment of the 
industry arising a lender being put under statutory management leads to 
(near) inter-bank market freeze,  lender banks seek to pack their liquidity in  
sort end of the risk free assets – the 91-day Treasury bills in our case.  
 The findings of the data analysis indicate that 91-day Treasury bill 
rate positively and significantly affects the interbank market rate. Results for 
period prior to banking industry stress and after the industry stress indicate 
that the effect of 91-day Treasury bill rate on interbank market rate rises 
significantly upon the occurrence of banking industry stress as compared to 
the stress free period. In fact, the results indicates that the effect of 91-day 
Treasury bill rate on interbank rate doubles upon the placement of a lender 
under receivership. On the volatility front, banking industry stress in awake 
of collapse of a lender triggers high volatility clustering. As evidenced by 
results for EGARCH model placement of Chase bank under receivership 
portrayed high volatility clustering as compared to Dubai and imperial bank 
case.  
 From the results we conclude that volatility shocks at the interbank 
are long lived rather than transitory implying that the intervention by the 
Central bank to restore efficiency in the interbank market in allocating 
market liquidity by using open market operation tools such as treasury bills 
upon the occurrence of banking industry stress is deficient of solving 
structural challenges within the interbank hence long lived shocks in the 
interbank market upon the occurrence of such banking industry shocks. Such 
interventions only helps the market to move towards near normal situation 
but fails to address structural weaknesses of the interbank market. In terms of 
information asymmetry, our results suggests that bad news significantly 
impacts on interbank market compared to good news of the same magnitude 
hence an evidence for leverage effect. Further we note that even with the 
intervention by the CBK, the leverage effect in the interbank market still 
remains. 
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